(De) regulation of working time, employer capture, and 'forced availability' : a comparison between the UK and Cyprus food retail sector by Hadjisolomou, Anastasios et al.
Hadjisolomou, Anastasios and Newsome, Kirsty and Cunningham, Ian 
(2017) (De) regulation of working time, employer capture, and ‘forced 
availability’ : a comparison between the UK and Cyprus food retail 
sector. International Journal of Human Resource Management. ISSN 
0958-5192 , http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2017.1342682
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/60970/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
1 
 
De) regulation of working time, employer capture, 
DQGµIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶ a comparison between the 
UK and Cyprus food retail sector 
 
Anastasios Hadjisolomou, SWRC, University of Stirling 
Kirsty Newsome, University of Sheffield 
Ian Cunningham, University of Strathclyde  
2 
 
Introduction 
This article is concerned with exploring how working time is regulated and experienced in the 
highly competitive international food retailing sector in two EU countries ± the UK and Cyprus. 
Working time across the EU is regulated through the European Working Time Directives. The 
Regulations are enacted in the domestic legislation of member states with considerable 
differences across national boundaries (Boulin et al, 2006). Variations and gaps in state 
intervention imply scope for other actors (i.e. employers, employees and unions) to influence 
and shape the regulation of working time in their own interests.  
To capture the interaction of different employment relations actors shaping the regulation of 
working time in supermarket retail, this paper adopts a theoretical perspective developed by 
Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie (2004 and 2005). This perspective on regulation does not 
privilege one site or actor such as the state in terms of the focus of analysis, but accepts that 
regulation in employment relations is a multifaceted phenomenon shared by a number of 
competing public and private actors at different institutional levels. Moreover, the dismantling 
or absence of state mechanisms does not mean that regulation does not exist, or is dormant. 
Rather, it suggests a shift or a recasting of regulation across different sites and between the 
different actors. These actors include the state, industrial relations institutions, such as 
collective bargaining at sector or firm level and/or unilateral management decision-making at 
firm/enterprise level (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004: Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio , 
:LWKLQDµUHJXODWRU\VSDFH¶LQWKLVFDVHZRUNLQJWLPHWKHVHDFWRUVGHSOR\DUDQJHRI
mechanisms, of social control for a multiplicity of different purposes. Regulation is thus  fluid 
implying shifts and movement across different sites and boundaries (Martinez-Lucio and 
Mackenzie, 2004: Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio, 2005). 
This article utilizes the Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie framework (2004 and 2005) in several 
ways.  Firstly, in the literature section the framework is used to outline how working time 
regulation in the grocery retail sectors of UK and Cyprus is shared by a number of competing 
public and private actors. At the same time, this section argues that employers have become 
more dominant and captured key aspects of working time regulation in the face of inadequate 
OHJLVODWLYHSURWHFWLRQDQGZHDNHQHGXQLRQV ,QGRLQJVR LWKLJKOLJKWVKRZWKLV µFDSWXUH¶E\
employers in the context of recession and competition leads to greater management efforts to 
make working time increasingly  flexible. This flexibility in terms of the allocation of working 
time has the effect of undermining terms and conditions of employment of front-line workers 
in the UK and Cyprus retail sectors. The second use of the framework is to empirically explore 
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the implications of this µFDSWXUH¶(Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). In particular, how 
employers are introducing new ways to regulate working time, the  impact on employees and 
the degree to which these changes are contested. Thirdly, the framework recognises that a 
decline in influence of regulatory actors (e.g. the state or unions) does not preclude a reassertion 
of their role (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). IQWKHOLJKWRIWKHVWXG\¶VILQGLQJV options 
for the reorganisation and re-regulation of working time away from the enterprise level are 
explored. 
The retail supermarket sectors in the UK and Cyprus provide interesting sites of international 
comparison regarding the themes of this paper. This is because although there are differences 
in working time setting regimes, these are narrowing. Similar to the UK,  Cyprus is becoming 
a more liberalised economy with increasingly deregulated labour markets (Gialis and 
Leontidou, 2014). Unions and the institutions of collective bargaining in each of the national 
sectors are weak, with diminishing influence of collective agreements in Cyprus, placing 
greater emphasis on enterprise-level decisiRQV 0RUHRYHU HDFK FRXQWU\¶V UHWDLO VHFWRU LV
H[SHULHQFLQJVKLIWVLQWKHVWDWXWRU\UHJXODWLRQRIZRUNLQJWLPHWKDWGLUHFWO\&\SUXV¶VH[WHQVLRQ
of Sunday trading) or indirectly (the continuing legality of zero hours contracts in the UK) 
support a climate where employers are given greater discretion and control over rostering and 
scheduling. 
The article begins with the aforementioned literature section. The next section outlines the 
method. The results are then presented from a comparative qualitative study in food retailing. 
7KHILQDOVHFWLRQSUHVHQWVDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHDUWLFOH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ This contribution includes 
the key finding that increased employer control over the timing of shifts and rotas leads to the 
SKHQRPHQRQRI µIRUFHG DYDLODELOLW\¶ IRUZorkers in food retail. Such strategies can emerge 
through formal (UK) contractual processes and informal (Cyprus) line management behaviour 
and practices. These employer strategies disrupt home and family life among retail workers, 
causing tensions with the front-line. In Cyprus, these tensions are exacerbated by 
accompanying forced moves from full-time to part-time work, and management flouting 
national and EU-based statutory protections for employees regarding working time. 
The Regulation of Working Time in Food Retail in the UK and Cyprus 
As with other sectors the regulation of working time in food retail is shared by multiple 
competing actors, including the European Union (EU), nation states, collective bargaining 
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institutions and enterprise-level decision-makers. The EU introduced the Working Time 
5HJXODWLRQVWRRIIHUVRPHSURWHFWLRQIRUZRUNHUV¶ULJKWV7KHDLPRIWKHVH(8PHDVXUHVZDV
to introduce limits to working hours and introduce rest breaks on the grounds of health and 
safety (Eurofound, 2016). The measures introduced maximum average 48 hour working weeks 
(based on a 17 week period) over seven days, limits on the hours of night work, a rest period 
of not less than eleven consecutive hours in each 24 hour period, and finally a break of not less 
than 24 hours uninterrupted in a seven day period. Employees whose working time is more 
than six hours in a day, were also entitled to a rest break (Devlin and Shirvani, 2014). 
Responsibility for enacting these measures was passed onto member states leading to 
considerable differences both in the organisation and regulation of working time and in how 
the directives are translated into policy instruments (Boulin, et al, 2006).  
In the UK the Working Time Regulations 1998 (amended 2003) were introduced against a 
EDFNJURXQG RI FRQFHUQV UHJDUGLQJ WKHLU SRWHQWLDO GLVUXSWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V
deregulated and flexible labour market (Hurrell, 2005). Indeed, costs to the UK economy of 
this form of employee protection were estimated at £1.8 to £2.3bn (Gilman, 1997). As a result 
of such concerns, legislation was applied in what many saw as a minimalistic way, with 
FRQVLGHUDEOHHPSOR\HUGHURJDWLRQV+XUUHOO0RVWFRQWURYHUVLDOO\ZDVWKHµ$JUHHPHQW
WRH[FOXGHWKHPD[LPXP¶ZKLFKVWLSXODWHGWKDWthe 48 hour maximum shall not apply in relation 
to a worker who has agreed with her/his employer in writing that it should not apply in her/his 
case. This derogation can relate to a specified period or apply indefinitely. At the same time, 
the agreement can be terminated by the worker by giving not less than seven days' notice to his 
employer in writing (HMSO, 1998). In the UK, this derogation handed considerable discretion 
for employers to influence and regulate individual working time arrangements among their 
workforces at enterprise level.  
In Cyprus, the transposition of EU legislation showed a much more pluralist regulation of 
working time, as the Directive was fully aligned to the provisions of existing collective 
agreements through the Law 63 (I)/2002 Organisation of Working Time (Eurofound, 2016). 
The standard time norm of the working week has been a 38 hour, 5 day week. This is a 
consequence of efforts prior to the 2008 financial crisis to reduce working time through a 
Framework Agreement between employers and unions that aimed for a reduction in working 
hours from 40 to 38 hours. In addition, reductions in overall hours is thought to reflect the entry 
of greater numbers of women into the workforce through part-time work (Eurofound, 2016). 
Moreover, in Cyprus, in terms of the length of the working week, retail sales, unlike the rest of 
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the economy (five days per week), were subject to a six day week (EurWORK, 2009). Prior to 
the crisis, however, it was the case that under the law, the working week for shop workers could 
not exceed 38 hours or eight hours in a day. There were also stipulations regarding overtime 
compensation for working weekends; rest breaks and free afternoons for those working a six 
day week. These figures indicate relatively low working hours and mean the Working Time 
Directive did not make any significant impact when introduced in Cyprus (EurWORK, 2009).  
Beyond the derogations outlined in the above UK legislation, there are weaknesses in the 
SURWHFWLRQVDIIRUGHGWRZRUNHUVIURPWKH(8¶VDQGWKH8.DQG&\SUXV¶VUHJXODWLRQRIZRUNLQJ
time. There are general concerns, for instance, regarding weak enforcement mechanisms 
SHUWDLQLQJWRWKH(8¶VZRUNLQJWLPHUHJXODWLRQVOHDGLQJWRIHDUVRIWKHJURwth of unregulated 
overtime across the single market (Eurofound, 2016). Furthermore, the regulations do not 
provide any protection concerning scheduling or rostering of time, leaving this aspect in the 
hands of national governments, and industrial relations institutions and other actors. In the 
majority of member states in the EU, employer power in this regard is mediated because the 
(8¶VVWDWXWRU\PHDVXUHVPHUHO\VHWWKHJHQHUDOIUDPHZRUNIRUIXUWKHUZRUNLQJWLPHUHJXODWLRQ
(including rostering) through collective agreements (Eurofound, 2016).  
In contrast, in the UK, employer discretion over rostering is stronger because unlike other EU 
states, there are very few accompanying sector-level collective negotiations and agreements on 
working time. Therefore, in the UK the regulation of working hours below the 48 hour limit is 
decided almost unilaterally by employers at the enterprise level (Eurofound, 2016).  Studies in 
other front-line service occupations reveal how UK employers have used discretion over the 
allocation of working-time to match staffing levels to periods of high demand.  This has several 
consequences most notably; reducing costs  by not rewarding work-related time periods that 
are not high or direct customer related, the intensification of work during periods of high 
customer demand (Rubery, et al, 2015), and work (especially part-time) becoming increasingly 
fragmented (Blyton, 2011; Blyton and Jenkins, 2012). In the case of UK retail authors have 
noted that flexible working arrangements, have grown significantly in recent years(Allan et al, 
2000; Grugulis and Bozkurt 2011).  
Moreover, the rise in the management prerogative following the  2008 financial crisis and 
downturn presented  governments and employers in the UK and Cyprus with opportunities to 
further capture working time and introduce more flexible and unpredictable working 
arrangements under their tutelage.  (Eurofound, 2016). In the UK, for instance, the lack of 
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regulatory protection concerning the scheduling or rostering of working time is illustrated by 
its high proportion of part-time work, standing at 23.7% of the employed labour force in 2015 
(Eurostat, 2017). It is estimated that 77% of private sector employers employed part-time 
workers in 2011 (Wanrooy, et al, 2013). Those working part-time in the UK on average work 
16.2 hours a week (ONS, 2016).  Moreover, there has also been a reported increase in other 
numerical flexibility practices such as proliferation of zero-hour contracts (ZHCs). ZHCs are 
where the employer does not guarantee the employee a minimum number of hours. Studies 
reveal an upward trend in the numbers of workers employed on such contracts (Adams and 
Deakin, 2014). Indeed, retail is reported as employing 11% of its workforce on ZHCs (CIPD, 
2015). The growing presence of ZHCs is seen to be symptomatic of a UK labour market that 
is increasingly dominated by unilateral management prerogative, and characterised by 
demands for ever more employee flexibility, and greater uncertainty for workers regarding the 
scheduling of work. 
Cyprus has been following the path of other Mediterranean EU partners (Greece, Italy and 
Spain) (Gialis and Leontidou, 2014) in pursuing de-/re-regulation trade-offs designed to help 
firms recover from reduced demand in the post-2008 crisis era and help reduce high levels of 
youth unemployment. These trade ±offs are achieved through using flexible employment 
strategies. The Mediterranean, EU countries in post-2008 have moved towards introducing de-
regulatory policies that have allowed employers to introduce labour market flexibility and 
lower levels of employment security. In the former case, this includes flexible working time 
practices, i.e. encouraging part-time employment and atypical employment (Gialis and 
Leontidou, 2014).  
For Cyprus, the country has some way to go compared to the UK in terms of labour market 
flexibility, because of low levels of part-time work. Although the level of part-time work is 
steadily increasing over the years, standing at 12.9% in 2015, is still behind that of the rest of 
the EU28, which currently stands at an average of 19% (Eurostat, 2017). Nevertheless, 
recession and economic crisis are accelerating change. Economic problems have led to 
increasing unemployment, especially for young graduates at 17.5%. Cyprus also had the 
highest increase of unemployment within the Eurozone in 2013. Subsequently, efforts to 
increase employment in Cyprus were made, LQ SDUDOOHO ZLWK FDOOV IURP HPSOR\HUV¶
organisations to increase flexibility within the workforce to keep pace with economic change 
and allow time scheduling to be directly connected to variations in demand (Eurofound, 2016).  
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In retail, in 2013 the Cyprus Government at the peak of the recession, in an attempt to tackle 
increasing unemSOR\PHQW SURYLGHG DQ LPSRUWDQW UHYLVLRQ DQG µWUDGH RII¶ UHODWLQJ WR WKH
µ5HJXODWLRQRIWKHRSHUDWLRQRIVKRSVDQGWKH(PSOR\PHQW7HUPV¶7KLVLQYROYHGLQVWLWXWLQJ
an extension of opening hours for employers within the retail sector, extending the working 
week to seven days: following a path in the rest of the EU towards greater Sunday Working 
(Eurofound, 2015). The new regulations specified an extension to the opening hours for retail 
shops, so that they were allowed to remain open between 7am-10pm daily and 9am-9pm on 
Sundays. Previously, they only remained open until 8pm on weekdays, with the exception of 
Wednesdays when they closed at 3pm. This state sponsored de-regulation and re-configuration 
of working time was a turning point for the Cyprus employment relations system, signifying a 
move to a more liberal economy. 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQZDVWKat the additional working 
time would be covered by firms recruiting from the unemployed. At the same time, it must be 
stressed that the measure involved no compulsion on employers to recruit staff from the 
unemployed (Eurofound, 2015), leaving them considerable discretion regarding how the 
additional shifts from extended opening times were to be rostered. 
In each country, state and employer efforts to reorganise working time in food retail in the 
interests of the latter, are in the context of a highly restricted role for other actors in this 
regulatory space, particularly trade unions. Retail work is poorly unionised throughout the EU 
(Eurofound, 2016). Supermarket retail, unsurprisingly shares this characteristic. In the UK, 
there are high profile partnership agreements, such as in Tesco and its recognition of USDAW. 
This is the biggest private sector collective bargaining agreement in the UK, and one of the 
biggest in Europe (Blythman, 2005). The agreement covers issues such as pay structures, 
attendance, disciplines and work-life balance (Engage for success, 2012). Yet, Williams (2014, 
SQRWHVµWKHSDUWQHUVKLSDJHQGDµLVWRDODUJHH[WHQWDUHIOHFWLRQRIWUDGHXQLRQZHDNQHVV¶
and in the case of Tesco, the union was concerned that the company was contemplating de-
recognition.  
In Cyprus, Katsourides (2013) reports general falls in union density as a result of aggressive 
employer strategies to union organization, especially during the recent recession. The outcome 
of lower density, according to Ioannou (2011), is that the unions have abandoned strikes as a 
tool to geneUDWHFKDQJH7KHUHIRUHDV.DWVRXULGHVSUHSRUWVµWUDGHXQLRQVWRGD\DUH
PRVWO\ SHUFHLYHG DV RUJDQL]DWLRQV WKDW RIIHU VHUYLFHV UDWKHU WKDQ YHKLFOHV RI VWUXJJOH¶ $V
,RDQQRXSFRQFOXGHVµWKHFXUUHQWFULVLVH[DFHUEDWHGWKHDOUHDG\existing processes 
RIODERXUPDUNHWUHJXODWLRQWUDGHXQLRQGHFOLQHDQGGHWHULRUDWLRQRIHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQV¶
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0RUHRYHU LQ UHWDLO OLNH WKH8.&\SUXV¶VFROOHFWLYH VHFWRUDODJUHHPHQWVFRYHULQJZRUNLQJ
time are increasingly giving way to enterprise level decision-making (Eurofound, 2016). 
The above summary illustrates how a central aspect of the employment relationship such as 
working time encompasses a variety of processes of social control (statutory and non-statutory) 
and a multiplicity of competing actors operating at different levels (Martinez-Lucio and 
Mackenzie, 2004 and 2005). It reveals, however, how employers have had considerable scope 
to capture and unilaterally regulate essential areas of working time such as rostering and 
scheduling. This capture is because of the limited scope of statutes by the EU and national 
governments, and the weakness of other actors such as trade unions. Of concern is the degree 
to which this greater employer discretion and capture of working time at a time of recession 
further degrades employment conditions through allowing creating more precarious and 
fragmented forms of work. Moreover, the article seeks to understand how these changing 
patterns of working time are experienced by retail workers and the relevance, if at all, of EU 
and national statutory protections. 
Methodology  
This article draws on qualitative data from four case study organizations, two in the UK and 
two in Cyprus. This multiple international case study strategy allowed both the within-case, 
cross-case, as well as cross-national analysis. The selection of the cases aims for consistency 
of comparison on the organizational level, while the emphasis on deregulation across both 
countries allows a comparative cross-national analysis of how the regulatory regimes in the 
two countries, which emphasises on labour market flexibility and flexible working time 
practices, impact on the organizational level within the same sector.  
The case study organizations were selected based on their size and their market share in the 
local and the global market. The UK organizations are both leaders in the global and the UK 
food retail sector. UK1 is a British-grown multinational grocery retailer, whilst UK2 is a 
multinational company that holds a significant share of the UK market. Similarly, the Cyprus 
case study RUJDQL]DWLRQVDUHOHDGHUVLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VIRRG-retail market. Cy2 is a world leader 
grocery-retailer with presence in 33 countries, including Cyprus since 2005. On the other hand, 
Cy1 is a smaller µIDPLO\-RZQHG¶organization with only seven stores and approximately 700 
employees. Although this is a smaller organization, it is a developing company and is steadily 
increasing its market share. It is a leader in its region and is expanding its business to other 
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areas of the island, becoming today the second biggest home-grown food retailer in the country.  
The research in both organisations took place in 2013/4 in the period of austerity following the 
2008 financial crisis. Cyprus at this time was facing particularly acute recessionary pressures.  
Qualitative research data were secured using semi-structured interviews with respondents in 
each of the case study organisations. The qualitative research involved 90 interviews across the 
two counties and specifically 44 in the UK and 46 in Cyprus. In the UK the interviews were 
conducted in English, whilst in Cyprus they were conducted in Greek and translated in English.  
In total four stores were examined in the UK in the west of Scotland. One large store was 
examined for UK1, whereas three stores were explored for UK2. In Cyprus, three stores were 
examined in total, all located in the North east of the island. Two stores were examined for Cy1 
(the head/store and store2, which is located in a tourist area), while one store was explored for 
Cy2. In each store the interviews were conducted with HR, senior and line managers, union 
representatives, and shop-floor employees, aiming to understand the different perspectives on 
the problem examined. Interviews lasted between 35-90 minutes and focused upon a number 
of key themes, including the nature of the work, the job process, the regulation and organization 
of working time and working time scheduling.  
The following data illustrates the consequences of employer capture of key areas of working 
time regulation. The data is organised around two substantive sections; the first covering the 
UK; and the second Cyprus. In each of these sections the data is themed by first identifying the 
competitive, economic and regulatory drivers of change in the retail grocery sectors of the two 
countries. This is then followed by an analysis of how management is using its capture of 
rostering and scheduling to introduce work practices and innovations designed to extract even 
greater flexibility from their workforces. Moreover, this section includes an analysis of the 
reactions of employees to such changes.  
5. UK: (De) regulation, Employer Capture and new forms of fragmented 
working-time 
Intensified pressure for cost control resulting  from the recent recession allied to  changing 
consumption patterns were key GULYHUVIRUPDQDJHPHQW¶VHIIRUWVWRrecast and reshape  working 
time in the UK. The impact of the intensified cost pressures meant the UK grocery sector is 
characterized by fierce price competition amongst a small number of dominant players. The 
evidence from the two UK case studies confirms this cost focus.  As the store HR Manager in 
UK1 argued:  
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µ(YHU\WKLQJ LV GULYHQ E\ FRVW«LW LV D ORZ FRVW EXVLQHVV«HYHU\ERG\ LV
SUHGRPLQDQWO\GULYHQE\FRVWDQGVDOHV¶6WRUH+508. 
In the same vein, one HR manager in UK2 discussed the financial pressures as a result of the 
recession and the increased competition, describing the lower cost strategy in the organization: 
µ2XUFXOWXUHKDVDOZD\VEHHQDEHWWHUVHUYLFHEXWEHFDXVHRI WKHFKDQJHV LQ WKH
economy over the years, the challenge is to still get the best service but [with] lower 
costs, because UK2 [organizations name] is all about cost and you want to get the 
best possible price for the customer; but you really need to control your cost. So 
FRVWDUHWLJKWHUQRZWKDQWKH\HYHUZHUH«,WKLQN\HDUVDJRLWZDVDERXWSHRSle and 
it was about how customers get serviced. It's still about that, but we have to do it in 
DPRUHEXGJHWDU\FRQWUROOHGZD\¶+508. 
Both organizations aggressively pursued policies to cut labour cost and introduce lean staffing. 
Attempts to reconfigure working time were at the heart of this approach, whereby the 
reconfiguration of working-time was predicated upon changes in the allocation of shift patterns 
and the emergence of new type of contracts.    
 At the same time, management also reported that there were changes in consumption patterns 
that demanded alterations in working time. The Regional HR manager in UK1 commented: 
µ)URPDIOH[LELOLW\SRLQWRIYLHZPRVWVXSHUPDUNHWVWHQGWRKDYHDKLJKZRUNIRUFH
of part-time workers. Full-WLPHFRQWUDFWVDUHYHU\UDUH«:HQHHGIOH[LELOLW\WR
respond to peaks and the changing nature of retail...Most  stores trade between 
5pm and 9pm, far more than any other time during the day, which is been a big 
change on retail. A lot of people do shop on the way home from work or during 
WKHQLJKWVRWKDW¶VSUREDEO\FKDQJHGTXLWHDORWWKDWLVZKHUH\RXQHHGSDUW-time 
ZRUNHUV¶5HJLRQDO+508. 
The two UK organizations offered working contracts significantly shorter than the EU 
upper limit of 48 hours per week. These contracts were increasingly staffed using part-
time employees. Typical staff ratios across the two UK cases were 80% part-time, 20% 
percent full time. 
For employees, a central feature of this part-time work was the fragmentation of their 
working life into small blocks of paid work. The majority of employees, across both cases, 
particularly those on the front-line, were on 3.5 hours shifts, whilst the weekly working 
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hours varied across the two organizations between 8-27 hours, depending on the contract 
type and the amount of overtime work. For example, an HR manager in UK1 commented: 
µNot a lot of people are on full time, but we do have a lot of part time hours. On  
checkouts they do 3,5 hours shifts, but if there's overtime a colleague would pick 
XSDQH[WUDVKLIWRQWKDW«we have quite a few colleagues that work more than 30 
hours [through overtime]¶ (HRM1.UK2) 
Part-time work was not the only method deployed by employers to control working time 
and cut costs. Employers further introduced other IRUPV RI µfragmented¶ DQG KLJKO\
flexible employment in the form of flexi-contracts. As will be shown, these flexi-contracts 
provided management with considerable power to shape working time, and bring in new 
forms of employment degradation. 
5.1 Flexi-contracts and µIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶ 
UK1 LQWURGXFHG WKH µIOH[L-FRQWUDFW¶ to more closely co-ordinate staffing levels with the 
exigencies of customer flow, while simultaneously managing cost pressures. Flexi-contracts 
were introduced to complement the increasing recruitment of young students who required 
flexibility in their working hours to match the demands of their university timetable. The 
contracts differ from zero-KRXU FRQWUDFWV =+&V DV WKH µIOH[L-HPSOR\HHV¶ ZHUH JXDUDQWHHG
minimum contracted hours that could be extended. Employees on flexi-contracts usually 
worked during busy periods on the shop floor, such as weekends, and covered night shifts. 
Employees could also be asked, typically at short notice, to work additional shifts in order to 
cover emergency labour needs such as absence.  In essence, flexi-contracts firmly strengthen 
employer control over the allocation and organisation of working time, leaving the 
responsibility for allocating working time and shifts with line managers. As one line manager 
commented: 
³Shifts are always covered, theUHDUHQRHPSW\SODFHVRUJDSV«we've got the flexi-
staff, so we flex them up where we need them to cover´ (LM1.UK1)   
Employees on flexi-contracts were engaged under different terms and conditions and were 
required  to undertake  overtime and/or cover additional shifts. What differentiated the flexi-
contracts from these other more conventional working time arrangements and management ± 
worker relations, was that it was mandatory for flexi-contract employees to accept overtime 
and extra shifts, as this was part of their written terms and conditions. By stipulating contractual 
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compliance with such demands, employers were creating an environment of µIRUFHG
DYDLODELOLW\¶ for employees.  One employee argued,   
µ7KH\SKRQHSHRSOHWRFRPHLQWRKHOSWKHPIRUWKDWGD\«DQGXVXDOO\WKHVHDUH
flexi contracts; they rely on them to help. [But] I'm thinking that I'm getting 
called in whenever they [managers] please and other [employees] don't need 
WR¶(8. 
Another flexi-employee commented:  
µ<RX KDYH WR EH DYDLODEOH DQG ZLOOLQJ WR GR VRPH >RYHUWLPH@¶ >)RU H[DPSOH@ ,
worked all day on Friday and then I had to be at work for a full weekend and I don't 
like it, [but] it's not my choice (E14.UK1).  
7KHFOLPDWHRIµIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶is further illustrated by employees on flexi-contracts being 
constrained in their ability to refuse overtime.  One argued:   
 ³<RXDUHDOORZHGWRVD\QRWKH\
OOXQGHUVWDQGLI\RXKDYHPD\EHFRPPLWPHQWVRU
something but there is only so many times you can refuse because it is in your 
contUDFW,W¶VDIOH[L-FRQWUDFWVR«\ou are sort of forced in a position that you have 
to do this, and a lot of time you have to work late. I don't want to work late ever, is 
QRWDJRRGWKLQJLW
VQRWIXQ(8.´ 
The uncertain demands for extra working hours, generated feelings of frustration, unfairness 
and pressure for employees to be constantly available to work.  
µ0RVWRIWKHWLPHVKH>WKHPDQDJHU@ZRXOGVD\%HFDXVH\RXDUHIOH[LLWLV\RXU
GXW\«\RXQHHGWRZRUNWKHVH>KRXUV@7KDW
VDELWRIXQIDLU(8.¶ 
Similarly, another flexi-contracted employee described how additional shifts brought 
significant intensity to their working lives during busy periods such as Christmas: 
µOne time last year they put me on six in the morning for Christmas eve, I just 
worked up to 10pm WKHQLJKWEHIRUH«DQGWKH\ZDQWPHWRVWDUW6am on Christmas 
eve to 3pm«it's unreasonable. Compared to any other contracts you are the one 
that you get phoned and told that you need to work and that's it done. I find it a 
bit not fair really; there are other types of contracts that don't need to do that so it 
can be unfair¶. (E5.UK1) 
Another flexi-employee stated:  
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µI'm contracted to eight [hours] [but] usually I do up to eighteen at the 
ZHHNHQG«SHRSOH [on flexi-contracts] get shifts that they don't want [and] these 
are those that other people don't want. We are flexi, it's a different contract, [but] 
WKHVKLIWV WKDWZHJHWDUHQRWJUHDW«LVQRW IDLU LIHYHU\ERG\ LVGRLQJKRUULEOH
shifts all the time«7KHV\VWHPLVDELWRIannoying. You just don't want to and 
\RXNQRZ\RXKDYHWR,WFDQEHLUULWDWLQJDWWLPHVGHILQLWHO\«EXW\RX did sign 
WKHFRQWUDFWVRWKHUHLVQ
WDORW\RXFDQGR«VR\RXVRUWRIIRUFHGLQDSRVLWLRQ
that you have to do this [and] this was increased dramatically (E9.UK1).¶ 
The union representative also discussed the level of uncertainty regarding the working hours 
associated with the flexi-contract. She argued that the young employees often did not 
understand the contract they had signed until they experienced the pressure by managers to 
accept overtime and attend work. 6KHHPSKDVL]HG WKH WUDGHXQLRQ¶VGLVDJUHHPHQt with this 
scheme but at the same time she suggested that this was embedded within the working time 
arrangements in UK1: 
µOh flexi-contracts, tKH\DUHMXVWKRUULEOH«WKH\RXQJRQHVQHHGWKHPEHFDXVH
WKH\DUHLQFROOHJHEXW«\RXZRQ
WNQRZWKHGD\EHIRUHZKDt your shift is going 
to be the next day. The union don't particularly like them but at the same time is 
SDUWRI8.¶V>FRPSDQ\QDPH@ZRUNLQJVWUDWHJ\VR\RXKDYHWRJRZLWKLW. I 
still don't like them and I still don't agree with them¶ (Union.Rep.UK1) 
6. Cyprus: Encouraging regulatory capture by the employer - The impact 
of post-UHFHVVLRQDU\µSULFHZDUV¶DQGVWDWHintervention   
The Cyprus grocery market has faced dramatic changes in the past decade. The factors driving 
this change were largely due to competition and recession. Traditionally dominated by home-
based grocers, overseas operators (e.g. Cy2 in 2005) have increasingly entered the market, 
including an international discount food retailer. These new entrants have generated pressures 
for cost cutting and lower product prices across the sector. The senior financial manager of Cy1 
commented:  
µ7KHFRPSHWLWLRQKDVFKDQJHG6LQFHWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHWDLOHUVLQYHVWHGLQ&\SUXV
we have seen a tremendous impact on our profitability, it dropped by 3% and this 
is massive. We constantly look for new and innovative ways to remain competitive, 
increase our profit margins and of course keep cost to the minimum. Today you 
14 
 
have to be cheap to survive, lower cost is synonymous with our operations 
(SeniorManager.Cy1) 
This manager also discussed the influence of the aggressive price war in the market that had 
been exacerbated by recessionary pressures. Within this context of pressures to reduce costs, 
the financial line manager in Cy1 and store manager in Cy2 identified labour as a major source 
of savings to increase sales and profits for the supermarkets.  
³Labour cost is directly linked with your turnover. Lower cost means higher 
turnover...The head office knows at any point what your sales are and how much 
you spend on labour. They always argue that we spend too much on labour; it goes 
without saying that we have to keep an eye on our [labour] cost.´ 
(StoreManager.Cy2) 
Recession also had its impact and cutting labour costs was key to how each organisations 
initially responded to this challenge through either redundancies or other measures. In Cy2, for 
example, the closure of departments, redundancies, and recruitment freezes were vital cost 
reduction measures to ensure organisational survival.   
At the same time, changes in the configuration of working time were also key tactics utilized 
by both case study organizations to cut costs in this difficult environment. In Cy1 a manager 
illustrated this dual approach.   
³If I had the power I would definitely consider redundancies and more flexibility in 
staffing. There are two main shifts, the morning that starts at 7am and the afternoon 
RQH«:K\GR\RXQHHGDIXOOKRXVHDWDPLQWKHPRUQLQJ"*HWWKHPRQDVSOLW
rotas and keep an on-call cohort of employees for your busy times in the afternoon. 
This would save you at least 10 people and would significantly reduce the cost. For 
me we are overstaffed at the moment, and this is not healthy for the business 
(LM5.Cy1). 
At the same time, these management aspirations to some degree faced barriers because of the 
aforementioned intervention by the state to reform the µ5HJXODWLRQRIWKHRSHUDWLRQRIVKRSV
DQGWKH(PSOR\PHQW7HUPV¶. This reform stipulated hat the extension of opening hours was to 
be filled by recruiting from the unemployed. However, there was no compulsion on firms to 
recruit unemployed workers. As a result  Cypriot employers were able to use their freedom to 
manipulate working time at the enterprise level to cover the new shifts through more efficient 
use of their existing labour.    
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Subsequently, in each case organisation new recruitment was kept to a minimum. Instead, to 
cover the new hours management in each company simply reduced the number of employees 
working on shifts and enhanced the support and cover from other departments in case of 
absences or unexpected peaks in customer demand. This change in working-time allocation 
intensified the work of some employees, generating pressure and feelings of frustration among 
the workforce. One employee commented: 
µ:LWKWKHQHZRSHQLQJKRXUUHJXODWLRQVWKHPDQDJHPHQWZDVVXSSRVHGWRUHFUXLW
new people to cover Wednesdays and Sundays. Instead though they just split the 
staff into shorter shifts, three girls in the morning, three in the noon shift and three 
in the afternoon/late shift [instead of five and/or six in each shift]. They did that in 
order not to recruit new staff, but we are pressured more, especially during the 
summer period (E9.Cy2).  
 ? ? ?/ŶĨŽƌŵĂů ?ĨŽƌĐĞĚĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? 
Management¶V UHVSRQVH WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V PHDVXUHV also resulted in increased, often 
unwanted, working hours for existing employees. Employees in Cy2 remonstrated that the 
increasing hours of work impacted on their personal life, and led to a sense of powerlessness. 
As a checkout operator commented: 
µ/DVWPRQWK,ZRUNHGIRUWKUHHZHHNVZLWKRXWDGD\RII«LW¶VULGLFXORXV:HFDQQRW
have any time off. We are not robots. We always had a day off [but] QRZ LW¶V
impRVVLEOHWRJHWLWWKLQJVKDYHFKDQJHG¶(8.Cy2) 
Other measures (in Cy2) including moving all full-time staff to part-time contracts, and when 
recruiting mainly only hiring the latter. As with managers in the UK, the store manager 
suggested that the increase in part-time employees was a mechanism to reduce costs by being 
able to flex up and flex down  
µ%\KDYLQJSDUW-timers, you can increase or reduce their hours based on your needs 
and by reducing their hours you have a direct positive effect on the ODERXUFRVW¶
(StoreManager.Cy2) 
This shift away from full-time to part-time work again had DVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQHPSOR\HHV¶
personal life. One employee in Cy2 (a single mother) commented: 
,¶PZRUNLQJSDUWWLPH«,DVNHGIRUDIXOO-time contract but it was impossible to get 
LW«WKH\ VDLG WKH\ GRQ¶W GR IXOO-time contracts anymore. But the money are not 
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HQRXJK,JHW¼>PRQWKO\@DQG,VSHQG¼IRUFKLOGFDUH,XVHGWRGRWZRMREV
but now because of the baby [I only do one] (E11.Cy2) 
The above quote was a common response, particularly among participants with families and 
dependants.  
&\SURYLGHGDQRWKHUH[DPSOHRIµIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶DPRQJRXUFDVHVWXGLHV, specifically in 
Store 2. This Store had always been open on a Sunday because of the seasonal nature of its 
opening times in a tourist area. Prior to the introduction of changes to the µ5HJXODWLRQRIWKH
RSHUDWLRQRIVKRSVDQGWKH(PSOR\PHQW7HUPV¶, the Head Store supplied workers to cover the 
extra Sunday shifts in Store2. In addition, these additional Sunday shifts were voluntary for 
employees and they were paid overtime (double-time). Unsurprisingly, because of the 
additional income, there were always employees wanting to work these extra shifts.  
After the introduction of new opening hours, however, the Head Store no longer sent 
employees to cover the additional shifts because it was now also operating on Sundays. This 
forced the organisation to recruit new employees, as the government decree suggested.  
However, these new employees were not hired in sufficient numbers to completely cover the 
new shifts. As a result, it became mandatory for the employees in Store2 to work on Sundays.  
Front-line employees in Cy1, in both stores, became reluctant to work on Sundays, because the 
company (illegally) no longer paid overtime for this shift. Nevertheless, the data illustrates that   
LWZDVQRORQJHUDWWKHHPSOR\HHV¶GLVFUHWLRQZKHWKHUWKH\ZDQWHGWRZRUNWKHH[WUDKRXUVDV
managers were now forcing employees to cover the extra hours. One young checkout operator 
(HeadStore.Cy1) commented:  
µ6XQGD\LV>QRZ@DXVXDOGD\¶VSD\PHQWDQGQRRQHZDQWVWRZRUNLWDQ\PRUH:H
are forced now to attend on Sundays, because the Store manager got angry and she 
VDLGWKDWLW¶VPDQGDWRU\IRUDOOHPSOR\HHVWRZRUN RQ6XQGD\V(QGRIWKHVWRU\¶
(E9.Cy1) 
Similarly a checkout operator in Store2 commented:  
µ1RZWKDWWKH+HDGVWRUHUHPDLQVRSHQLWLVFRPSXOVRU\IRUHYHU\RQHWRZRUNRQ
6XQGD\V¶(&\).  
There are some differences in this H[DPSOHRIµIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶FRPSDUHGWRWKH8K. 
Specifically, in Cyprus there is no formal contractual obligation on employees to attend 
WKURXJKDµIOH[L-FRQWUDFW¶, rather it is enforced through informal management coercion.  
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 In addition, it appeared that were limited opportunities to take break from this work pattern.  
µ7KH\IRUFHXVWRZRUNRQ6XQGD\V,WLVVXSSRVHGWREHHYHU\RWKHUZHHNEXW,¶YH
EHHQZRUNLQJIRUWKUHH6XQGD\VLQDURZQRZ,¶YHEHHQZRUNLQJHYHU\GD\IRUWKH
ODVWWKUHHZHHNVZLWKRXWDGD\RII¶(.Cy1).  
The above reference to working everyday was a common complaint, as well as being often 
called in to cover shifts on short notice.  
Interestingly managers referred to the EU working time directive and national employment 
legislation when discussing how the rotas were prepared, especially the provisions concerning 
maximum hours of work per week and rest periods between shifts. In practice, however, these 
regulations did not seem to be followed especially after the introduction of the new opening 
hours. A checkout manager acknowledged this issue: 
³We now have the new law and lots of issues on working hours for the staff. 
[According to the law] they have to have three free mornings and three free 
afternoons every week. This was the law [so far] and we had to prepare the rotas 
based on this. Of course [now] this is not always followed. We are open seven 
GD\VDZHHNDQGLW¶VGLIILFXOWWRSUHSDUHWKHURWDV\RXNQRZ3HRSOHKDYHWRZRUN
on Sundays, this is the new law, this is what we do now (LM3.Cy1)´ 
7. Discussion  
This paper has explored the regulation of working time in the grocery retail sector in the UK 
and Cyprus following the 2008 financial crisis. The literature section highlighted how working-
time in retail grocery is regulated by a multiplicity of different actors. At the level of the EU, 
regulations present in both countries curtail the maximum number of working hours an 
employee could work in a given week. Yet, in accordance with Martinez-/XFLR¶V DQG
0DFNHQ]LH¶VIUDPHZRUNDQG, the literature further suggested limitations to this 
statutory framework and highlighted the ways in which regulation can be captured and 
performed by other actors beyond the boundaries of the state, notably employers. In both 
FRXQWU\¶VUHWDLOJURFHU\VHFWRUV employers at the enterprise level exercise increasing unilateral 
discretion other the rostering and scheduling of work. For the UK, this power held by 
employers has been assisted by the recent recession and a labour market characterized by 
extreme forms of flexible working practices such as ZHCs. In Cyprus, a more pluralistic 
approach to regulate working time was apparent, but increased competition, state reforms and 
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the weakening of unions are establishing a more favourable environment for management to 
exercise their prerogative over working time.  
The consequences of this capture of aspects of working time regulation was then explored 
empirically across retail grocery stores in the UK and Cyprus. The data revealed similarity and 
difference in employer strategies and employee experiences.  Overall, in the UK the use of 
flexi-contracts illustrated the higher discretion available to management to regulate working 
time to meet their priorities. Managers use this tool for rostering and overtime in order meet 
customer flow and save costs. For employees, the requiremenWV RI µIRUFHG DYDLODELOLW\¶
frustration, growing unpredictability, increased difficulties in managing work-life balance were 
clear outcomes of these managerial regimes. The UK data in many ways paints a bleak picture, 
because commentators have called for the reform or abolition of ZHCs in favour of contractual 
conditions that guarantee at least some minimum hours (Adams and Deakin, 2014). Yet, this 
study has revealed how guarantees of working hours can ring hollow for employees under these 
regimes of forced availability EHFDXVH LW LV PDQDJHPHQW¶V XQLODWHUDO FRQWURO RYHU URVWHULQJ
these guaranteed hours that degrades their employment. The research, as similarly reported by 
Cunningham and James (2016), and in line with the analysis of Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005), 
suggests that where the state withdraws or neglects part of a regulatory space in liberal market 
economies, in this case the UK and Cyprus, the consequences are employer capture and unilateral 
decision-making. MacKenzie and Martinez-Lucio (2005) argue that regulation exists at various levels 
and changes at one level impact upon others. This study evidences the re-configuration of regulatory 
roles and suggests regulatory transfer beyond the boundaries of the state, enhancing the position of the 
employer in the regulatory space of working time (Mackenzie and Martinez-Lucio, 2005, 2014). This 
leads to even less autonomy and control of work for employees.The Cyprus cases highlighted how 
the recession and state intervention have pushed employers in retail to adopt harsh measures to 
reduce labour costs, with the capture and manipulation of rostering and attendance a key 
element in their strategies. Existing employees were subjected to forcible changes to their 
contractual status from full-time to part-time work, along with unpredictability regarding the 
timing and length of hours, cuts in income andDJDLQµIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶. Workers, in turn, 
reported increasing frustration, and a sense of powerlessness in the face of these changes. These 
cases also suggested the open flouting of EU and national regulations on length of the working 
week and rest breaks. Another disturbing finding from the Cyprus cases is the ability of 
employers to disregard changes in regulations designed to substantially decrease 
unemployment, in favour of sweating existing labour to save on costs. 
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Some of these findings reflect concerns of other writers. Standing (1999, p.81), for example, 
argues, when the organizations call for employees to be flexible it usually means they are asked 
to make concessions. The concessions expected of employees in this case appear to be growing 
µVFKHGXOH LQVHFXULW\¶ DOOLHG WR WKHSRVVLELOLW\RIJUHDWHU ILQDQFLDO LQVWDELOLW\DQG LQFUHDVLQJ
difficulties in managing work-life balance (see Wood and Burchell, 2014). 
The phenomenon of µIRUFHGDYDLODELOLW\¶of employees raises new concerns and questions in 
the study of low paid work in the field of comparative, international human resource 
management (IHRM). Whether through formal contractual (UK) or informal, coercive 
management style (Cyprus) examples of µIRUFHG DYDLODELOLW\¶ suggest  employers appear to 
increasingly have the ability to compel employees to attend work outside their normal working 
hours and at times considered unsocial, e.g. Sundays, with limited additional rewards. The size 
of the sample of organisations and numbers of workers interviewed leads us to be cautious 
about the generalizability of these findings. Moreover, the sometimes informal nature of such 
practices poses questions regarding their sustainability if there is a considerable improvement 
in the respective labour markets at sector and national level. Yet the characteristics of these 
management practices and consequences on employee well-being mark them as a significant 
contribution from this study and suggest a need for further international research to understand 
how widespread these practices are and the full consequences for employees.   
In terms of the drivers of the phenomenon of forced availability, it is clear blame lies in 
intensified competition in grocery retail, the weakness of EU and state regulatory structures in 
not covering key areas of working time, as well as a lack of strong union representation.  Yet 
we recognize that an absence or decline in influence of regulatory actors (e.g. the state or 
unions) does not preclude a reassertion of their role (Martinez-Lucio and Mackenzie, 2004). It 
would be simple to identify the state as the key actor in this regard, as the results of this paper 
suggest the need for re-regulation of rostering and scheduling. Such statutory measures can 
SHUKDSV LQFOXGH QHZ LQGLYLGXDO ZRUNSODFH ULJKWV IRU HPSOR\HHV WR UHIXVH µFRPSXOVRU\¶
demands for attendance outside of normal working hours. However, the way employers 
(according to this study) are able in certain contexts to ignore national and EU regulations 
suggests industrial relations institutions/collective bargaining should also have a role in 
policing and improving on statutory provisions.  
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 Conclusions 
The theme of this special issue - µworkplace UHJXODWLRQ¶ ± prompted the use of Martinez-
/XFLR¶VDQG0DFNHQ]LH¶VIUDPHZRUNWRH[SORUHWHQVLRQVLQWKHUHJXODWLRQRIZRUNLQJWLPHLQ
the retail grocery sectors of Cyprus and the UK. In doing so, it highlights the capture of 
rostering and scheduling by employers at the enterprise level as a key characteristic of the 
regulation of this key aspect of the employment relationship. It further explores the 
FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVµFDSWXUH¶empirically. In doing so, it reveals how the limits of EU, state 
and industrial relations regulation, coupled with recessionary and sectoral pressures have 
enabled employers to recast working-time to more meticulously match the exigencies of 
customer demand with lean staffing levels. The consequences include the phenomenon of 
µIRUFHG DYDLODELOLW\¶ ZKLFK EULQJV QHZ FRQFHVVLRQV DQG LQVHFXULWLHV DPRQJ ORZ SDLG DQG
vulnerable workers. The article has further highlighted new avenues of concern and future 
research in the field of critical IHRM studies. In particular, the need to further research into 
µFRPSXOVLRQ¶ LQ working time in different sectoral and international contexts. Finally, it 
suggests the need for collective and individual solutions from all regulatory actors to protect 
vulnerable workers in retail grocery sector and beyond.  
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